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Abstract
Authenticity and integrity are crucial elements of trust in physical or elec-
tronic document archiving. This thesis analyzed the functional requirements
of authenticity and integrity and how to ensure them in the context of the
Norwegian public administration records. NOARK is the Norwegian record-
keeping and archiving standard and Fedora Commons an open source archival
repository software are used as a record management system and archival
system respectively to establish the case of the study.
For the purpose of meeting the objectives of the study, standards, litera-
tures and previous studies on the area of trusted recordkeeping and archiving
are analyzed; on the basis of which an archival framework addressing au-
thenticity, integrity and trusted chain custody is proposed and prototype is
developed as a proof of concept. The validation is carried out by purposely
compromising the authenticity and integrity of the electronic records in the
process of transferring from NOARK to Fedora Commons and detecting the
failure in either of authenticity or integrity or both before and after archiving
the records.
The study found out that records archived using our framework have
met the authenticity and integrity requirements of archival objects. Records
archived using the proposed archival framework are found to improve the
evidential value of records for court cases.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter introduces the problem in which the study is grounded and why
the problem is so important to be addressed. In addition, the objectives, the
scope and the significance of the study are described.
1.1 Motivation
Milakovich and Gordon (2008) defines public administration as:
Public administration may be defined as all processes, organi-
zations, and individuals (the latter acting in official positions and
roles) associated with carrying out laws and other rules adopted
or issued by legislatures, executives, and courts(p. 11).
Records serving as active registers of these processes, organizations and
individuals are public administration records. Policies, laws, legislations and
other transactional records between the state and the citizens are some ex-
amples of public administration records. Public administration records doc-
ument the event triggered the process, the whole process between the event
and the final decision and the final decision to the event. The purpose of
public administration records is to document activities , process and deci-
sion of the state and make them available to citizens. Archiving of the public
administration records is one way of ensuring the availability of the records
to current and future citizens.
Archiving plays a vital role in documenting historical developments of a
nation. For instance in Europe archives are created to document property,
in Australia to document locations of fresh water and in North-America
to document movement of herds or relationship between deities and man
(Hoeven, Albada, Informacio´n, & UNISIST, 1996). The archived documents
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are created to witness accounts of their time for future users of the archive.
World War I document archive1 and World War II documents2 are archives
containing records about the two major wars of the world. The documents in
these archives serve as an account or witness of what has happened in those
times.
However; the documents stored in archives could be lost due to natural
disasters like earthquake, flood, cyclones; carelessness, fire or war. A partic-
ular example is the contents in the library of Leuven3 which are “reduced
to ashes” as a result of war. The problems mentioned above are common to
both digital and physical archives. In addition to the shared common prob-
lems, the information in digital archives are vulnerable to disappearance or
lose due to technical or non technical failures (Waugh, Wilkinson, Hills, &
Dell’oro, 2000). The technical failures includes deterioration of the media
on which the information is stored or the software reading the information.
Inability to preserve aspects of the information that makes the digital in-
formation useful; which include the information’s status, its ownership, its
reliability, its authenticity, and its retrievability fall under the non technical
failures.
Despite the problems mentioned above in electronic archiving, a study
finds out that users wished to have electronic versions of the most important
documents for reasons other than trust(Hart & Liu, 2003). This shows the
gap between electronic documents and trust. This raises a serious problem
when it comes to using digital documents from the archives of the public
administration records as a reference to address a particular public issue. In
addition to this, the gap between trust and electronic documents will put the
witness value of the archived documents in question.
Records are increasingly produced and archived electronically. The gap
between electronic documents and trust puts the archived records in question
when it comes it using them as a witness of their time. It is this necessity
of addressing trust in electronic archives triggered the undertaking of the
current study.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
Trust is defined as an action on the basis of a subjective personal judgment(Arne-
Kristian Groven, 2008). Though trust is a subjective action, the process of
arriving at the outcome of trusting a particular digital information can be
1http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/
2http://www.paperlessarchives.com/world war ii.html
3http://www.kuleuven.be/about/history.html
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supplemented with constructive evidence. As Hart and Liu (2003) indicated
in the study trust needs to be embraced in every process and component of
digital preservation. With the view of preserving trust in digital information,
the study considers authenticity and integrity as a means of preserving trust
in every chain of the digital objects and records transaction.
Authenticity deals with verification of the accompanying claims associ-
ated with a digital object (Muir, 2001). The claims are usually the descrip-
tion of the digital object expressed in some form like metadata. For instance
a digital object (Do) claiming to be written in the year (Y’) by author (A
Do
) is authentically acceptable unless either Y’ is proved to be not the year
the object is written or ADo is proved to be not the author of the object.
In other words, authenticity concerns more on proving whether the object is
what it purports to be or not. In a more realistic sense of currently existing
commercial applications, there exists a third party (P T ) who manages these
issues, and the trust we assign on the objects relies partly on the confidence
we assign to the third party (P T ). Integrity on the other hand, deals with the
actual content of the digital object. That is whether the object(Do) is still
the same today as it was first created in the year (Y’) by the author (ADo).
That means, the content of the object (Do) remains unchanged intentionally
or unintentionally over time or in transit(Lynch, 2000).
In archiving objects from records or producers of digital contents a partic-
ular care for addressing these trust requirements – authenticity and integrity-
should be taken into account; otherwise a content or an object in the archive
which failed to pass authenticity and integrity test will have no legal value
or unacceptable to be used as evidence in a court case (Florence, 2010). If
an object in the archive has no legal value or acceptance in its basic form,
the effort and resources spent in preserving that content is as good as a
capital waste. This implies that addressing these trust requirements at the
basic stage of archival development is an absolute survival requirement of
the archival objects. It is this basic survival necessity of archival trust which
formulates the problem of this study. In addition, many of the researches un-
dertaken in the field of archiving are chief theoretical as Waugh et al. (2000)
pointed out; which as experience taught there are times of ultimate sacrifices
while experiencing theoretical accuracies into practice4. So to address the
above mentioned problems, this study considers authenticity and integrity
of electronic archiving of digital objects having evidential value the prime
focus of the study. To balance the theory with practice and to validate the
proposed solution a prototype is developed.
4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software bug
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1.3 Objectives of the Study
The research aims to investigate the issues involved in the archival of trusted
digital objects having evidential value to court cases. The study analyzed
the functional requirements of authenticity and integrity for trusted archival
of objects using the Norwegian archival standard – NOARK as a record
management and Fedora Commons as an archival repository case. To address
the objective, the following questions are asked:
• what are the functional requirements of authenticity for long term
archiving of trusted objects?
• what are the functional requirements of integrity for long term archiving
of trusted objects?
• what are the functional requirements of trusted chain of custody for
archiving of trusted objects?
• how do we ensure authenticity and integrity during the process of trans-
ferring records to archive?
• how do we ensure authenticity and integrity after objects are being
archived?
1.4 Scope of the Study
The study is about authenticity and integrity in archiving of digital objects.
Specifically, the study focused on the functional requirements of trusted dig-
ital objects for submission into the archive from records. The process of
maintaining trust in the record side specially in NOARK-5 is a complex pro-
cess of tracking down records for twenty five years before the records passed
onto the archive(MoReq, 2009). As the result the study focused more on the
submission side of the problem i.e. once after records are marked finalized.
In addition, studying users of the archive is also out of the scope of the study
as the result the consumers side or the dissemination information package
trust maintenance issues are also out of the scope of the study. The process
of maintaining trusted objects with in the archive and the process of trusted
submission including chain of custody handling is what this study focused
on.
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1.5 Significance of the Study
The study might have the following significances:
• it might help in raising awareness of archival bodies towards trusted
archiving
• it might help in informing archival software developers on the process
of maintaining trusted chain of custody and archiving of trusted digital
objects
• it might also help in informing archival bodies on the process of main-
taining integrity within the archive
• maintaining archives with evidential value for court cases is a delicate
matter. One of the significance of the study might be imparting a
method of achieving such to archive maintainers
• the output of the study might also be incorporated in the development
of archival software
• it might also serve as a spring board to researchers along the same line
of theme.
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Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews literature conducted within the area of trust in records
management and archiving of digital objects. Authenticity and integrity are
the elements used to describe trust in this study. The chapter operational-
izes trust and the elements authenticity and integrity; and further reviews
the requirements in the maintenance of trusted records and archiving of ob-
jects from studies conducted within the area. In addition, the Norwegian
e-signature act is summarized to examine the admissibility of digital doc-
uments in court cases. The Open Archive Information System(OAIS) and
the mechanisms of handling trust requirements in the model concludes the
chapter.
In addition to Google, ACM digital library, Emerald, IEEE Xplore and
ScienceDirect online databases are used to gather literature for review. The
search terms used contain the combination and variant of the words “trust”,
“authenticity”, “integrity” “archiving”, “digital” “object” “record”. For ex-
ample a typical search using “integrity + authenticity + digital + objects”
on Google produces more than seventy six thousand results during the time
of undertaking the study. In addition to the archival search terms, phrases
like “Evidential weight and legal admissibility of electronic information” is
also the common phrase used in the online databases to relate the evidential
value of records and objects archived digitally.
2.2 Definition and Operationalization
This section defines the most common words related to trust and contextu-
alizes their usage in this study. The words include trust, trustworthiness,
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provenance and non-repudiation. The necessity of highlighting the related
words is for the sake of inclusiveness of the literature review section with
regards to concepts related to trust and also it helps to establish the scope
of the study.
One of the basic shifts in the understanding of trust is the shift in viewing
trust as a property to an assessment. The property view of trust implies that
trust is something that can be built into the systems which users are supposed
to rely on. However; the way people develop their trust to a system or an
object or another person or organization is mostly based on their day-to-day
interaction rather than the trust component built and incorporated within
the system. This view of reality in trust development by researchers lead to
the shift in the paradigm of of trust; that is, trust as property to trust as an
assessment (Denning, 1993).
Viewing trust as an assessment retains the subjective nature of trust;
which is based on an individual assessment of an object under investiga-
tion or declaration of others assessment about the object under investigation
whom the investigator trusts (Denning, 1993). An individual may choose to
trust a particular object to be written by the claimed author on the basis of
personal assessment. An assessment can be carried out on the basis of pre-
vious personal experience or else certain expected behavioral attributes. For
instance, we chose to trust amazon on the basis of previous personal transac-
tion experience with amazon or trust a particular hand writing belonging to
the claimed author examined by an organization which we trust. Ultimately
an object is trusted if and only if users of the object trusts it which makes
trust a subjective matter(Arne-Kristian Groven, 2008).
On the other hand, Lekkas (2003) identified four kinds of trust in a cur-
rent society. Calculus-based Trust, Information-based Trust, Transitiveness-
based trust and trust within a social system. Calculus-based trust is estab-
lished between involved parties on the basis of possible risk analysis. The
developed trust is a result of careful mathematical calculation. A typical ex-
ample of calculus-based trust is business partnership where partners carefully
analyze profit loss before committing trust to one another. This type of trust
might seem an objective attempt to materialize trust; however; ultimately
despite the result of the mathematical calculation, partners may still chose
to trust and venture or not. This is what makes trust a complex matter to
deal objectively. Information-based trust is an incremental relation resulting
from continuous assessment and interaction overtime. As the result uncer-
tainties decrease and the trust relationship develops further. This is trust
based on interaction and intimacy. Transitiveness-based trust is trust devel-
oped through a trusted third party. The trust between participant entities
is developed through a trusted third party, which the participant entities
7
trust. This kind of trust is the most common form of trust in the electronic
world. For instance certificate authorities are trusted third party organiza-
tions where users of their services chose to trust both the organization and
other users of the certificate authorities. Trust within the social system is
a trust developed because of participation within a social system; as the re-
sult participants develop trust exclusive to the system. For instance trust
developed based on membership is a typical example of this type of trust.
The context of trust in this study is the kind of trust which is developed
through trusted third party which is the Transitiveness-based trust and its
contextual understanding in this study is the one adopted from (Lekkas,
2003):
The notion of trust in a TTP(Trusted Third Party) could be
defined as the customer’s certainty that the TTP is capable of
providing the required services accurately and infallibly, a cer-
tainty which also expresses the customer’s faith in its moral in-
tegrity, in the soundness of its operation, in the effectiveness of
its security mechanisms, in its expertise and in its abidance by all
regulations and laws, while at the same time, it also contains the
acknowledgement of a minimum risk factor, by the relying party
(p. 4).
On the basis of the above description, a trusted archival body is expected
to meet users requirement in the maintenance of the services it provides; and
assurances that the services it provides are intact either by introducing a
trusted third party which producers and users of the archive trust and rely
on or by becoming one of the trusted third parties meeting producers and
users expectation itself. However; in this study, an archival body which works
with an independent trusted third party is considered and modeled. The
trusted public third party is the one ensures trust for users, producers and
the archive trust and which complies with open set of standards facilitating
sustainability and cooperation. In light of which, integrity and authenticity
are considered as elements of trust that are particularly investigated in the
study.
A similar but slightly different concept related to trust is trustworthiness.
Unlike trust which is an action, trustworthiness is characteristic of objects to
be trusted indicating the object is worthy of trusting(Toma, 2010). The de-
velopment of trust can be facilitated by social interaction whereas judgment
of trustworthiness can be carried out in the absence of social interaction or
indirectly. To materialize the difference between trust and trustworthiness
in the context of this study, trust comes from the archival body action. The
archival body can choose to trust or not during archiving of a particular
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object; however; trustworthiness comes from the characteristic of the object
being archived. An object might exhibit trustworthiness but may not be
trusted. However; other studies in the field of socio-economics indicated that
the higher the degree of trustworthiness, the higher the trust(Tullberg, 2008).
Another concept related to trust is provenance. Provenance is informa-
tion regarding the creation, the chain of stewardship, or the version a partic-
ular object or record has undergone including the context of use (Buneman,
Chapman, & Cheney, 2006; Chapman, Jagadish, & Ramanan, 2008; Cheney,
2009). The provenance information generally comprise the version history
of a record or an object mostly in various format. The common provenance
information is kept in the form of metadata of a record or object. Provenance
provides further information regarding the sequence of events that lead to
the creation of the content, the context of the content creation and usage;
which can further be used to address issues that might arise after the creation
of the content. Trust is described as one of the motivations behind invoking
provenance information (Cheney, Chong, Foster, Seltzer, & Vansummeren,
2009).
Another related but slightly different concept to trust is non-repudiation.
Non-repudiation is a means of establishing proof that the producer of a par-
ticular content will not find a way to deny the fact of creating the content or
the archive body will not deny the reception of a digital content or commit-
ting a certain action on a digital object; proof of origin, proof of integrity and
verifying them using a third party are the mechanisms for establishing non-
repudiation to an electronic document (Peiris, Soysa, & Palliyaguru, 2008).
Proof of origin establishes an irrefutable relationship between the content and
the originator where as proof of integrity ensures the content is not altered
after creation which the third party uses to establish the non-repudiation of
the electronic content.
On the basis of the above theoretical assumptions, the likelihood of a
content to be trusted is facilitated if all historical information leading to the
creation of the content and a mechanisms for not denying them is intact.
Due to the policy of of archiving records actively used for twenty five years
in NOARK, incorporating the provenance in the prototype from the record
side needs a separate study by itself.
2.3 Evidential role: Authenticity and Integrity
This section describes authenticity and integrity as elements of trust and
ways of maintaining them from a general perspective in the preservation of
electronic contents. In addition, the evidential role authenticity and integrity
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in legal cases is analyzed and reviewed. Authenticity as described in the first
chapter, is the verification of the digital document’s accompanying informa-
tion in the form of metadata or the claims of the content; whereas integrity
is about the actual content being intact or unmodified without proper recog-
nition since origination or creation.
Evidence according to Gladney (2004, p. 407) is “information indelibly
recorded by two or more people who are unlikely to have colluded in mis-
representation”. The recorded information includes the actual content, the
metadata and any other closely related information recorded to provide ev-
idence that the content is trustworthy throughout the history of the object.
Since integrity is considered to deal with the actual content and authenticity
to the information regarding the content, their evidential role is significant.
However; highlighting “evidential integrity” and “evidential authenticity”
provision and maintaining mechanisms imparts a developmental role for the
study.
Evidential integrity refers to integrity of digital content acceptable as ev-
idence in court cases; so does evidential authenticity referring to metadata
of the digital content having legal value(Irons, 2006). However; the legal side
information requirement for admissibility of digital objects for evidence needs
an in-depth analysis by itself so as to come up with a fully-fledged evidence
requirement for electronic resources by legal institutions. This study, con-
centrates particularly on authenticity and integrity as a means of providing
evidence to digital resources.
Creating a digital fingerprint of the electronic content is the common
method of ensuring integrity. Hashing methods are used to generate a unique
checksum or message digest out of the digital content which is further signed
using the identity of the producer of the digital content. The algorithms
ensure integrity in a way that even a single addition of a space or changing
letter case results in a completely different message digest; which helps to
easily detect modification of the electronic content. Furthermore, authentic-
ity is information regarding the source of the content which can be expressed
in standard format using XML markup languages. However; in this case, au-
thenticity or source of the content is verified using the private identity used
to sign the message digest of the digital content. The mechanics of integrity
and authenticity verification is detailed in Figure 2.1. Keeping track of the
chain of custody of the whole process of archiving including authenticity and
integrity of the digital content is a crucial asset to the evidential value of the
archival objects as it properly logs all the actions that are carried out on the
object and by whom and when.
Use of public methods are the methods employed to assert authenticity,
integrity and custodianship which are used to model the proposed framework
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in the study. The public methods certify deposits of original objects, reg-
istration of unique identifiers, fingerprints, metadata or proofs in a publicly
available way(Bearman & Trant, 1998). Details of authenticity and integrity
mechanisms in NOARK-5 and Fedora Commons is discussed in the informa-
tion modeling chapter of the study. In addition, the chapter also details the
architecture of the proposed framework.
Figure 2.1: Process of Digitally Signing and verifying a Document
Figure 2.1 demonstrates a process of digitally signing and verifying a
document. As shown in Figure 2.1 A, the signing process is carried out by
applying a hashing algorithm on the document to be signed. The application
of hashing algorithm on the document to be signed creates a message digest.
The message digest is a one way compact fingerprint or unique representa-
tion of the digital document. It is one way because the algorithm makes
it impossible to recover the digital document out of the generated message
digest(Mel & Baker, 2001). The length of the message digest is determined
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by the type of hashing algorithm used for instance MD5 is 128 bit and SHA-1
160 bits and so on.
Since the proposed solution uses a public key cryptographic method ( see
Chapter four for detail ), the digital document signing party is assumed to
have two related but different keys initially before engaged into the signing
process. The two keys are the private key which is kept secrete and used only
by the signer; and the corresponding public key which can be distributed
publicly. Only the corresponding public key decrypts what is encrypted by
the secrete private key. Being able to decrypt a document with a public key
proves that the document is signed by holder of the private key. In addition
to this, the decryption of the document with the public key gives back the
message digest. The verifier of the document can calculate a message digest
out of the received document and compare the calculated message digest with
the message digest resulted from the decryption of the document. If the two
message digests are equal, then the document is not modified. In this way
public key ensures both authenticity and integrity of digital documents at
the same time.
As shown in Figure 2.1 A, message digest is created for the digital object
using hashing algorithms. Encrypting the message digest using the secrete
private key of the signer makes a digital signature. Appending the digital
signature on the digital document produces a signed document. It is possible
to verify authenticity and integrity of a signed document.
The process of verifying the signed document is shown in Figure 2.1 B. As
explained above, being able to decrypt the signed document using the public
key verifies that the document is signed by holder of the corresponding private
key. This proves the authenticity of the document. As show in Figure 2.1
B, decrypting the signed document using the public key produces a message
digest. This message digest is used to verify the integrity of the digital
document. That is, the verifier first calculates a separate message digest out
of the digital document using a similar hashing algorithm of the signer. If
the decrypted message digest and the calculated message digest are equal,
then the integrity of the document is intact.
As shown in Figure 2.1, using the public key method provides evidence
regarding the source and the content of a document. That is, it proves the
authenticity and integrity of the digital document with evidence.
2.4 The Norwegian E-Signature Act
The Norwegian e-signature act is the act of 15 June 2001 No. 81 on electronic
signatures which entered into force on 1 July 2001. According to MoReq
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(2009) an electronic signature can be used to verify integrity, authenticity
and is agreed to have the same legal function as hand written signature:
An electronic signature can be used to verify that electroni-
cally transmitted information has not been altered during send-
ing, to provide confirmation of who sent the information and as
verification that the sender will not be able to deny that he sent
it. These function are refereed to as securing of integrity, authen-
ticity and non-repudiation... an electronic signature is accorded
the same legal effect as a handwritten signatures(p. 21).
On the basis of the e-signature act describing electronic signature hav-
ing evidential value in legal environment, the study proposes a framework
embodying digital signature and develops a prototype in the context of a
trusted public third party architecture. The trusted third party as described
above adds value to the evidential value of digital documents by introducing
an open and publicly available chain of custody.
2.5 OAIS and Trust
Open Archive Information System (OAIS) is a reference model standard for
archiving information either in digital or physical form. The reference model
is developed by the Consultative Committee for Space Data System (CCSDS)
and approved for publication by the management council of the CCSDS and
published in January 2002(CCSDS, 2002). The reference model is developed
to standardize the terms and concepts in long term archiving. The common
platform created by the OAIS enables implementers to understand and col-
laborate each other. In addition to the popularity of the model among the
archival community, compliance to OAIS is one of the attributes of being a
trusted digital repository(RLG-OCLC, 2002). Moreover, the standard also
facilitates interoperability among archives. Allinson (2006) described OAIS
as a useful model to ensure long term preservation. FurthermoreFlorence
(2010) in her study finds out that archives in Norway follows the OAIS
model. Plus, OAIS is the framework of development for Fedora commons
which is the archival side software. It is due to the above reasons that OAIS
in relation to trust is reviewed.
We examine trust in OAIS from two perspective. Trust inside the OAIS
model and trust outside the OAIS model. Trust inside the OAIS model refers
trust after the digital object is deposited within the archive. Trust outside
OAIS refers trust before the digital object is archived which includes trust
in the chain of custody of records to archive.
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Figure 2.2: Problem domain in OAIS
Figure 2.2 depicts our problem space with respect to OAIS. The gray circle
area is the problem domain of the study. Producers are content creators.
In our case, the NOARK record management system is the producer of a
content. See chapter four for detail on NOARK. The submission information
package (SIP) as shown in the figure is an information package delivered
by the producer of content to the OAIS(CCSDS, 2002). Contents of the
SIP includes the records and its associated metadata. The OAIS then uses
the SIP to construct the archival information package (AIP). AIP like SIP
is an information package consisting the actual content plus the necessary
metadata for preserving the content(CCSDS, 2002). The difference between
SIP and AIP is a SIP is prepared primarily for transferring into the archive
where as AIP is created to preserve the information in the archive. The
AIP might include extra information. A SIP might be mapped into many
AIPs during archiving. A request to the archive documents can be made
using queries. The queries return back result or results to the users. The
dissemination information package (DIP) can be received by users in response
to orders; which is derived from one or more AIP(CCSDS, 2002).
The context of trust in the study is shown using a gray circle in Figure
2.2. The next section describes this context of trust in detail. That is, trust
outside OAIS describes trust in the process of submitting a record to the
archive. Trust within OAIS describes trust after the records are archived.
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2.5.1 Trust outside OAIS
Trust outside the OAIS is used to refer to trust related activities carried
out before receiving the digital object for archiving. Submission and “Pre-
Ingest” activities and Ingest are the OAIS functions which are treated for
the discussion of trust outside OAIS.
Submission and “Pre-Ingest”
Submission and “Pre-Ingest” activities are carried out before the archive ac-
cepts responsibility for archiving the content. Most of the critical activities
in the submission are management works like criteria of assessing submission,
collection development strategy and procedures. Ways of addressing trust in
those managerial activities are out of the scope of the study. However; the
pre-ingest activities which includes ensuring unique object identifier, validat-
ing integrity of the digital object and assessing the significant properties of
the digital object as described in RLG-OCLC (2002) are of interest to this
study.
As described in the previous section, the mechanism of validating integrity
is to calculate the message digest of the digital object to be ingested and
compare it with the one that is already supplied with the object. If the
two message digests are the same, then the chance of that object losing its
integrity along the way is almost none.
The authenticity of the object is controlled by the details of the properties
supplied along with the digital object. Establishing the properties require-
ment at this point is not the feasible interest of the study; however, if for
instance the object claims to be written by a solitude monk in the medieval,
the argument behind authenticity is “is there enough evidence to support
that?”. So, properties that have evidential value answering who, when, why,
how, for how long and the like should be provided together with the object.
However; in this thesis, authenticity is used to verify whether objects are
actually ingested from where they claim to be or not; which can be verified
using a private and public key combination as explained above.
Ingest
As depicted in Figure 2.3 ingest is a function which allows the objects sub-
mitted as Submission Information Package (SIP) to be prepared as Archival
Information Package (AIP) for storage in the archive (RLG-OCLC, 2002).
Receiving SIP is one of the functionalities of ingest(CCSDS, 2002). As it is
shown in chapter five, authenticity, integrity and chain of custody are main-
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Figure 2.3: Ingest Function
tained using the public private key security mechanisms. The details of the
how is also discussed in the same chapter.
2.5.2 Trust within OAIS
Trust within the OAIS is used to refer to the trust activities after the dig-
ital object is being archived and the archival body takes the responsibility
of custodianship. The activities include moving the AIP after ingest into
permanent storage, managing the storage hierarchy, refreshing the storage
media, providing all necessary information to allow objects to be dissemi-
nated from the repository, and disaster recovery(RLG-OCLC, 2002).
Most of the trust issues after the object is ingested can be addressed by
continuous integrity checking and keeping track of object access by users.
Since the Dissemination Information Package (DIP) is out of the scope of
this study, object access by users trust issues are not considered in this
study. Cryptographic techniques changes because of security risks over time
and transformations an object might undergo inside the archive; for instance
format obsolescence, are the two major reasons that have an impact on the
long term maintenance of integrity within the archive (Song & JaJa, 2007).
In this study, Fedora Commons is used as an archiving software; and the
process of integrity verification and maintenance is discussed in detail in the
information modeling chapter.
As Mu¨ller, Fornaro, Rosenthaler, and Gschwind (2010) explained in their
study maintaining authenticity and integrity in digital environment is a very
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challenging task. Most of the studies undertaken in the preservation of digital
objects integrity and authenticity uses the common cryptographic technique
of hashing (Maniatis, Roussopoulos, Giuli, Rosenthal, & Baker, 2005; Shaw,
2000; Song & JaJa, 2007). These studies focus only on the maintenance
of integrity and authenticity within the archive. But they do not address
integrity and authenticity in the process of transferring records to archive.
In addition there is no third party to validate the authenticity and integrity
of the archived documents. As a result, these documents could lose their
evidential value to court cases.
In addition; authenticity and integrity are not only archive data specific
problems; for instance in other domains like electronic commerce, transac-
tions between clients and service providers need to be trusted and main-
tain integrity and authenticity. In order to address these problems in elec-
tronic commerce, they use public key infrastructure (Wing & O’Higgins,
1999; Wang & Wulf, 1999). Public key infrastructure keeps the integrity and
authenticity of transactions using a public trusted third party. The third
party verifies the authenticity and integrity of the transactions; for example,
the trusted third party verifies whether the amount a client transfers is un-
modified throughout the whole series of transactions from the sender till the
receiver end. In this work we used a public key infrastructure to improve the
authenticity and integrity of archive data. Specifically we used public key
infrastructure during the transfer of records to archive and after the docu-
ments are being archived. To the best of our knowledge our work would be
the first one to use public key infrastructure to maintain the authenticity and
integrity of archive files.
2.6 Summary
This chapter reviewed issues related to trust in the archiving of digital ob-
jects. Concepts related to trust are thoroughly analyzed for the sake estab-
lishing the focus of the study. Integrity and authenticity are used as a means
of supporting evidence for a digital object to be trusted or while archived or
long after it is being archived. The literature review also discussed the means
of ensuring trust in the chain of digital objects custodianship using public key
cryptography on the basis of which an archival framework is proposed and
prototype is developed. Besides the evidential role of trust using integrity
and authenticity, the OAIS model is discussed in relation to trust right before
and after the object is archived. The discussion of the Norwegian e-signature
act is included to analyze the admissibility of electronic documents as evi-
dence for legal cases as Norwegian archive standard NOARK is the record
17
side context of the case study.
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Chapter 3
METHODOLOGY
3.1 Purpose of the research
The research analyzes the functional requirements of archiving trusted digi-
tal objects having evidential values in court cases. The results of the study
will identify the functional requirements and ways of ensuring authentic-
ity, integrity and chain of custody of trusted digital objects archiving us-
ing NOARK-5 as a record management and Fedora Commons as an archive
repository case. The study assumes that there exists a third party which is
trusted and contents verified by it are legally acceptable.
3.2 Theoretical framework
Interpretive is the underlying assumption guiding this study. The researcher
aims at constructing meaning in the handling of trusted records and archive
from the context of the study; and as the result interpretive is one of the suit-
able underlying epistemological foundations for achieving such assumption(M. D. My-
ers, 2011). In addition, as Klein and Myers (1999) pointed interpretive has
the potential to produce deep insight into information systems phenomena
including the management of information systems and information systems
development which is what this study seeks to realize by constructing mean-
ing of trust in the context of the NOARK-5 and Fedora Commons. The
functional requirements of authenticity, integrity and trusted chain of cus-
tody is constructed using the shared understanding of the concepts. The
constructed meaning then will be applied to the context of the study.
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3.3 Approach/Methods
The study analyzes the functional requirements of archiving trusted Norwe-
gian electronic public administration records from shared contextual liter-
ature using an interpretive framework. This makes the study qualitative.
Moreover, the data collected and the procedure followed to address the re-
search questions are textual data which are used for the construction of the
contextual meaning of the problem- trust. Furthermore, in a qualitative ap-
proach the data sources used include documents, texts and the researcher’s
impressions and reactions as M. Myers (2008) described it; so does docu-
ment standards related to trusted archiving and maintenance and how that
relate to the context of the study that is NOARK-5 and Fedora Commons
are consulted to answer the research questions. Trust more than often tend
to be the application of a constructed judgment of the object presented to
an individual (Arne-Kristian Groven, 2008). Hence, a qualitative approach
provides the benefit of analyzing the process of trusting a record or an object
in the context of the study. As a result qualitative approach is chosen to be
more suitable to the problem at hand.
3.4 Research Strategy
The process of transferring records from NOARK to the archive Fedora Com-
mons and how authenticity, integrity and trusted chain of custody can be
maintained is the focus of the study. NOARK is chosen because it is becom-
ing a record keeping standard of the public sector in Norway; the country
where the thesis is carried out. Proximity and accessibility other than the
strong and clear records management tradition of Norway as (Florence, 2010)
described are the main reason behind the choice of NOARK. Though get-
ting real NOARK data is not as easy as it was initially anticipated, with the
help of the NOARK standard specification sample records are generated for
the purpose of validating our approach. The growing online user communi-
ties and more than ten years1 of sustainable development and refinement of
Fedora Commons to meet archival interests is the other reason for choosing
Fedora Commons as the context of the study. Trust is studied using NOARK
and Fedora Commons as the result an explanatory case study is employed as
a strategy for undertaking this research.
1http://www.fedora-commons.org/about/history
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3.5 Prototyping
NOARK produces records and marks them finalized once records are no
more expected to undergo further transaction leading to modification. A
MakeXMLFile extractor( see appendix) is applied to make XML files out
of the NOARK records. Once the XML file is generated out of the records,
XMLSec which is an XML security library(see section 5.2.1 for details) is used
to sign the records which produces record export format. Record export is
the proposed format for making records ready for transfer to the archive. The
submission information package(SIP) then prepares the records and transfers
them to the archive Fedora Commons. Figure 3.1 depicts the process of
prototyping.
Figure 3.1: Prototyping- the process
3.6 Validation
As a proof of concept we implemented a prototype. We validated authentic-
ity and integrity during and after transfer of records to archive. A transfer
process is authentic if the signature of the records from NOARK and ob-
jects from Fedora Commons is verified authentic by the third party. If the
message digest of the records and objects in the archive is verified unmod-
ified and intact by the third party, the records and objects are proved to
have maintained integrity. To do these, sample NOARK records are gen-
erated and a signature is appended into the individual records. After the
records are signed and made ready for submission into the archive, a manual
modification of records is done to see if the prototype can detect the failure
in authenticity and integrity during and after transfer. As the result, the
prototype detected the change and produced a failure message indicating
the records compromise in integrity and authenticity ( for more details, see
Appendix).
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3.7 Limitations of the Study
NOARK-5 data is not yet available for archival at the time of the research
undertaking. As Florence (2010) described it will take four to five years
before we see NOARK-5 documents being archived in archival institutions.
Even if NOARK-4 and NOARK-3 data is available, it is not possible to get
sample NOARK data to work with. This is primarily due to the fact that
the NOARK data contains personal and sensitive information. However;
sample NOARK data is generated on the bases of the NOARK specification
to circumvent the limitation.
3.8 Ethical considerations
Initially it was anticipated that NOARK data will be obtained from the
Norwegian national archive. On the bases of this assumption, the data was
anticipated to be used merely for the purpose of doing the research maintain-
ing confidentiality. Since the sample data is generated instead of working on
the real data, there is no major ethical concern.
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Chapter 4
INFORMATION MODELING
4.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with NOARK-5 and Fedora Commons in detail. Emphasis
on NOARK-5 record structure is given to establish a framework for NOARK-
5 compliant sample records generation in the next chapter. Fedora Commons
object structure and its metadata support is also discussed in this chapter.
A functional view of proposed architecture and details of ensuring trust in
the chain of submitting records from NOARK to Fedora Commons is the
main focus of the chapter leading to the conclusion.
4.2 NOARK-5
The use of the term NOARK from here on refers NOARK-5 and reference
to other versions of NOARK will use explicit version number followed by
NOARK like NOARK-3 to refer to version 3 of NOARK. Though NOARK is
both a recordkeeping and an archive specification, it is referred in this thesis
as a recordkeeping system. A recordkeeping system is used to support the
day to day activities of a business organization(Duranti & MacNeil, 1996).
NOARK is organized into three distinguished layers of abstraction named
inner core, outer core and complete. The inner core is the must meet require-
ment for a solution to be a NOARK compliant (MoReq, 2009). The inner
core requirement includes functionality for archiving, archiving based on the
requirements of the law and regulations, functions for administration and
operation of the core. The outer core is an optional component used for
integrating the inner core with other per-existing systems implemented with
individual organizations requirement. The NOARK complete functionality is
for integrating external solutions with the NOARK core functionality. Figure
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4.1 depicts the organization of the NOARK functionality taken directly from
the NOARK standard specification. The inner core comprises functionality
Figure 4.1: NOARK 5
including document capture, retrieval, peridoisation, preservation/validation,
transfer and administration where as the outer core includes e-mail, reporting
and user administration. Solutions like e-mail solution and user administra-
tion solutions are part of the NOARK complete. The difference between
e-mail in the outer core and e-mail solutions in the complete core is, the
e-mail in the outer core refers to a preexisting e-mail service within an orga-
niztion implementing NOARK whereas the e-mail solution in the complete
refers the integration of the organization e-mail system with external e-mail
solutions.
Since the study uses NOARK as a recordkeeping system to specify its
record structure, the next section discusses the record structure of NOARK
on the bases of which sample records are generated.
4.2.1 Record: Metadata and Structure
A record can be a result of a transaction between two parties. History of legal
proceedings, transcript of a trial or all the testimonies and items introduced
into evidence and lead to a particular decision can all be an example of a
record. Figure 4.2 demonstrates a typical transaction leading to the creation
of a record. A particular office receives and processes an application and
dispatches a reply on the basis of approval from the manager. A typical
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Figure 4.2: Transaction
record about this transaction comprises the reception of the application, the
reasoning leading to a decision on the application and the final response to
the application received. The registry of this particular context is an instance
for the creation of record. Records are then organized into files.
To delve into the structural requirements of records, it is necessary to
identify the types of records in NOARK context. NOARK identified two
types of records- simplified and basic records. Simplified records are records
that fit into the existing record structure and containing all the necessary
metadata in order to link the record into the existing record structure. Ba-
sic record is a record to keep track of records involving transaction. The
metadata requirement for simplified record and basic record is shown in the
following xml formatted structures shown in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4.
Those are the metadata requirements for NOARK records. In addition to
the metadata requirements, the standard lists a set of structural requirements
for record. The obligatory structural requirement for records include:
1. It is obligatory for a simplified record to be divided into different types
2. It is obligatory if the file level is used, a simplified record must belong
to (only) one basic file and a basic file can contain no, one or several
simplified records
3. It must be possible for a simplified record to contain no, one or several
document descriptions and a document description must be included
in one or more simplified records
4. It must be possible to expand a simplified record to a basic record
The structural requirements are further illustrated using the conceptual dia-
gram of a record shown in Figure 4.5. The idea behind reviewing the record
structure and metadata is to assess the overview of integrity and authenticity
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Figure 4.3: metadata for simplified record
at a record level in NOARK. Most of the activities at record level are related
to authenticity, activities like timestamping and logging records creator as
shown in the metadata structure. The standard also imposes integrity re-
quirements of metadata for a record once it is marked final. The standard
explicitly specifies an obligatory requirement for a record marked finalized,
it must not be possible to add more description to it. However; it does not
further specify how to ensure this in the implementation.
4.3 Fedora Commons
Fedora1 is an acronym for Flexible Extensible Digital Object Repository
Architecture developed by the Digital Library Research Group at Cornell
University as an architecture for storing, managing and accessing digital
contents in the form of digital objects. The licensing philosophy behind fe-
dora’s development is free and open source under the apache version 2.0
licensing creating an open pool of development and testing platform from
1http://www.fedora-commons.org/about
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Figure 4.4: metadata for basic record
developers all over the world giving fixes and solutions to bugs from users
and developer community. The current version of fedora is version 3 that is
the version used in the study which can be used to operate as a standalone
server, which is designed to be used with other software for designing a com-
plete solution(TheFedoraDevelopmentTeam, 2008). The key research ques-
tions leading the development of fedora are interaction with heterogeneous
collections of complex digital objects, the design of generic and genre-specific
objects, association of services and tools with objects, control policies on indi-
vidual and group objects, long term management and preservation of digital
objects. As can be understood from the key areas of questions, the heart of
the questions circle around digital objects. The next section discusses fedora
objects in detail.
4.3.1 Fedora Objects
Digital objects are the central building blocks of fedora architecture. Objects
in fedora are defined generically to provide essential characteristics for many
types of digital contents like documents, images, multimedia, metadata and
more. Fedora objects are aggregates of one or more content items into an
object. Figure 4.6 shows basic model of a fedora object taken from fedora
documentation2.
2http://fedora-commons.org/documentation/3.0b1/userdocs/digitalobjects/
objectModel.html
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Figure 4.5: Conceptual model at record level
An object has a persistent unique identifier which can either be defined
by users or automatically assigned by the repository. With the restriction of
not more than being 64 characters, a valid object identifier can be “demo:1”
or “demo:myrepository” which are also case-sensitive. The datastream rep-
resents the actual content item and metadata of the content item. The object
properties are system defined to manage and track the object in a repository.
These include datastream identifier for uniquely identifying the datastream
within an object; datastream state- one of the options from active, inactive
or deleted; created date; modified date; versionable which is set either true or
false so as to keep the original along with modified versions; descriptive label
for datastream; MIME type of datastream; format identifier; alternate identi-
fier; checksums which is used to keep track of the integrity of the datastream
using standard algorithms; byte stream content and control group which
could be internal xml if the content is stored internally as xml document,
managed content if both datastream and metadata stored internally in the
repository, externally referenced if the content is stored outside the repos-
itory and the repository is middling in streaming the content access, and
redirect reference content which the repository is used to store the universal
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Figure 4.6: Fedora object model
resource locator(URL) and access to the digital object happens without the
repository middling between.
Object Types
Fedora identifies four types of digital objects. All the different object types
conforms to the basic fedora object discussed above. Data object, service
definition object, service deployment object and content object model.
Electronic texts, images and books are some of the representations that fit
in data objects. Data objects are the actual content in the repository. They
can freely be shared between fedora repositories. Service definition object
is a control object used to store an interface listing the operations that are
supported by the data object which helps to add customized functionality to
data objects. In other words by using service definition objects, it is possible
to define a contract of supported operations on data objects. A collection
of service definition object constitutes a registry of service definitions in the
repository. Service deployment object describes how the operations defined
in the service definition object are delivered by the repository. The content
model object is a formal model characterizing class of digital objects. Model
of permitted relationships, excluded or required between models of digital
object can be provided with content model objects.
The rationality behind highlighting the different types of fedora objects
is to understand object types and on the basis of which handling authentic-
ity and integrity of records transfered into objects of fedora archive can be
made. As can be seen from the different types of objects, they all share the
common object properties which include checksum as one of the properties.
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Figure 4.7: Fedora Object Types
As a result, placing an integrity checksum on fedora objects can be used to
ensure objects integrity during ingest or submit. The next section discuss
the common metadata supported in fedora commons.
4.3.2 Fedora commons: metadata
This section describes the two common metadata fedora supports for de-
scribing the objects discussed above – FOXML and METS. Both describes
objects in fedora repository using the standard xml format.
FOXML: Fedora Object XML
FOXML is a simple xml format used to ingest and export objects to and from
fedora repository. In addition, it is also used to store objects internally into
the fedora repository. FOXML xml schema defines elements that correspond
to fedora digital objects.
At the highest level FOXML digital object comprises object properties
and data streams as described above. The skeleton xml representation of
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fedora object looks like the figure shown in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8: FOXML schema
A particular interest of this study is trust. FOXML address integrity of
objects while ingesting or after the objects are stored within the repository
using checksums. The checksum is specified using contentDigest tag within
the datastreamVersion tag.
Figure 4.9 shows how to place an md5 integrity checksum on the object
to be ingested in to Fedora Commons archive using FOXML.
Figure 4.9: FOXML Integrity support
METS: Metadata Encoding and Transmission Standard
METS provide an xml document for encoding metadata necessary for the
management of digital objects within a repository and exchange of such ob-
jects between repositories. METS document could be used in the role of sub-
mission information package (SIP), archival information package (AIP) or
dissemination information package (DIP) within the OAIS reference model3.
The standard METS document comprises of seven subsections – METS
Header describing itself, Descriptive Metadata, Administrative Metadata,
File Section, Structural Map, Structural Links and Behavior.
Figure 4.10 shows the standard elements comprising a METS document.
However; fedora commons tailored METS to meet the specific requirements
3http://www.loc.gov/standards/mets/METSOverview.v2.html
31
Figure 4.10: METS skeleton
of fedora commons. Enumerating how the standard mets mapped into fedora
METS is not the focus of this study. For the purpose of embarking on to one
of the objectives of the study, integrity of an object is specified in the file
section of the metadata for individual files constituting the object. Figure
4.11 is an excerpt of an object encoded in mets for fedora ingest.
The above section discussed FOXML and METS in the context of fedora.
The discussion of the metadata described how to encode integrity in the pro-
cess of ingesting digital objects into the fedora repository. The next section
describes the proposed architecture of our study.
4.4 Proposed Architecture
This section describes a high level view of the proposed architecture. In
addition to the high level view architecture, a functional view of the proposed
architecture addressing trust requirements are also discussed.
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Figure 4.11: Object Integrity encoding fedora METS
4.4.1 High level view
At a very high level, records are submitted to the archive. As discussed above,
records are handled by NOARK. The NOARK records are then submitted to
Fedora Commons archive repository. The assumption is both NOARK and
Fedora Commons communicate via the public Internet infrastructure.
Figure 4.12 shows the process of submitting records into the archive with-
out addressing trust requirements. Records submitted this way have very
little evidential value for court cases. As discussed in the literature section,
a trusted third party verifies trust requirements – integrity and authenticity
which adds evidential value to the content being archived. The trusted third
party verifies the authenticity of the records and the archive. Detailed dis-
cussion about the trusted third party is treated in the functional view section
of this chapter.
The high level view with trust(Figure 4.13) is the proposed architecture
of this study. The trusted third party is a public body which is trusted by
both the NOARK solutions and the Fedora Commons archival solutions for
securing their interaction. In addition, since the trusted third party is a
public body, the contents authenticated by it will be assumed to have legal
acceptance. The next section discusses the functional view of the proposed
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Figure 4.12: High level view without trust
high level view.
4.4.2 Functional view
The following section describes the functional view of the high level archi-
tecture depicted in the above section.
The NOARK record specification specifies two obligatory functional re-
quirements for a record and one optional. The obligatory requirements are:
• There must be a service/function for updating an Administrative unit
and Executive officer on a Record (Registry entry)
• There must be a service/function for updating a Client on a Registry
entry.
The optional requirement specifies a must need for a service/function for
updating a Registry management unit on a Record (Registry entry).
On the bases of the above requirement specifications, the functional view
of the NOARK record is expressed(see Figure 4.14).
Record export is proposed to be the format of records when they are
ready to be transfered to the archive; which can either be ingested by fedora
commons or prepared by the submission information package for submission.
As a result, trust parameters – integrity and authenticity check are placed
with respect to the record export.
Figure 4.15 shows the structure of the record export.
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Figure 4.13: High level view with trust
The trusted public third party keeps the public keys of NOARK and
Fedora Commons initially. For the purpose of distinguishing the keys of
NOARK and Fedora Commons, a label of DS-NO and DS-FC are used re-
spectively. During the process of verifying the submission process, the third
party is also proposed to keep its own copy of the contents transferred. Hav-
ing a copy of records transfered to the archive by the third party will have
the following advantages:
• it enables further verification of objects in the archive before moving
the objects to permanent archive
• redundancy increases the chance of records availability
• evidential value will be improved if records are also deposited with the
third party.
The numbers in Figure 4.17 indicates the order of messages exchanged
between NOARK, Fedora Commons and Trusted Third Party. Message la-
beled as <1> takes place first then <2> takes place and so forth. A request
to the submission information package (SIP) from the archive via the public
infrastructure is made by NOARK as shown in the figure. A reply to the
request is verified by the trusted party using the public key of archive. After
the verification of the SIP, the authenticated SIP is replied back. After the
records are prepared for submission using the authenticated SIP, a signature
of the NOARK will be appended and a submit operation will be carried
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Figure 4.14: Functional view of NOARK record
Figure 4.15: Record export format
out. The trusted party again verifies the signature of NOARK and copies
the whole content and sends it to the archive and itself. Finally the content
will be deposited in a temporary storage before moved into the archive for
permanent archiving. This helps the archive to verify the authenticity and
integrity once again against the trusted third party and move the content
to permanent storage. Figure 4.18 shows the signature validation strategry
used to verify authenticity and integrity of records.
4.5 Public Key Cryptography
Cryptography is used to convert a document or message into a scrambled or
disguised data. The disguised or scrambled data is assumed to be safe from
being read by anyone except those the document or message is meant for.
The process of converting a document into scrambled data is often referred
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Figure 4.16: Trusted third party
Figure 4.17: The proposed architecture: functional view
in cryptographic terms encryption. The reverse process, that is converting
the scrambled data back into original message is called decrypting. The
two common forms of encrypting a message are symmetric encryption and
asymmetric encryption.
Symmetric encryption technique uses a shared secrete key to encrypt
and decrypt the message. To ensure the safety of the message, the shared
secrete key must be kept secrete all the time. This type of encryption is very
easy to use and consumes less computing power. Since the secrete key is
shared, authenticity cannot be proved. In addition to this, when the number
of participants exchanging the message increases, distributing the shared
secrete key securely become problematic. However; one of the objectives
of our study is proving authenticity of records. As the result symmetric
encryption technique is not our preferred choice.
Asymmetric encryption on the other hand uses pairs of keys. As described
in chapter two, the pairs of keys are public key and private key. The private
key as the name implies is private and kept secrete. The public key can
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Figure 4.18: Validate signature
either be distributed publicly or kept in a public place. Unlike symmetric
encryption technique, the exchange of keys in asymmetric encryption can
take place openly. One of the pairs of keys is used to encrypt the document
and the other to decrypt the document. There is no need to share keys.
It is demonstrated in chapter two how this method proves authenticity and
integrity of a document. Due to this capability, public key cryptography
uses asymmetric encryption technique; which is the preferred choice for the
framework we proposed in the study.
One of the basic questions to ask in relation to asymmetric encryption
technique is how to distribute public keys? The answer to this as shown
in our proposed framework is the trusted third party. The trusted third
party also serve as a key distribution center which is commonly known as
certificate authority. A certificate authority is a public organization who
registers and provides assurances that a particular public key belongs to
a particular organization or person(Mel & Baker, 2001). In our case, the
trusted third party registers the public keys of NOARK and Fedora Commons
in its registry and publicly distributes the keys. In addition to distributing
the keys, the trusted third party also provides assurances that the keys belong
to NOARK and Fedora Commons as shown in Figure 4.17.
4.6 Summary
The chapter discussed the structure of NOARK records and their metadata
requirement. In addition, discussion of fedora objects structure and the com-
mon supported metadata types of fedora commons is given. The discussion
of NOARK records is given in order to generate a sample NOARK data for
testing the proposed framework. Furthermore, it also helps to match the
records to the archival metadata requirement for permanent storage main-
taining trust requirements. Finally the functional view of the proposed frame-
work and signature validation strategy is discussed.
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Chapter 5
EXPERIMENTS AND
FINDINGS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the experimental settings and findings of the study.
Details of the hardware and software used, the sample data and findings
answering the research questions are the sections constituting the chapter.
5.2 Experimental Settings
5.2.1 Hardware and Software
A personal computer 4GB of RAM, Intel Pentium Dual-Core cpu of 2.00GHz
is the hardware used to carry out most of the development work.Ubuntu
Linux, Microsoft XP, XMLSec, MySQL and Java are the software tools used
to carry out the study. Ubuntu is used as a server operating system hosting
the archive repository Fedora Commons. Microsoft XP is used as a client
requesting the submission information package for submitting records in to
the archive or as client where Fedora Commons ingests records for archiving.
XMLSec1 is a library software which supports major security standards like
XML signature and XML encryption. MySQL is used to create NOARK
records in a database. Java is the programming language used to generate
sample NOARK records and extract them in XML format from the database.
1http://www.aleksey.com/xmlsec/
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5.2.2 Data
Sample records
The process of creating sample records is carried out on the popular open
source database software MySQL. A database called noark is created with
two flat tables named srecord and brecord signifying simplified record and
basic record respectively. The following tables summarized the data types of
the fields in the srecord and brecord table according to the NOARK metadata
catalog.
Table 5.1: Simplified record
Catalog
number Name Data type Remark
M001 systemID TextString Unique
M081 recordtype TextString Undefined
M600 createdDate DateTime
M601 createdBy TextString
M604 archivedDate DateTime
M605 archivedBy TextString
M200 referenceParent TextString Undefined
M208 referenceRecordssection TextString arkivdel.systemID
M207 referenceDocumentdescription TextString Unique
M216 referenceDocumentObject TextString Undefined
Table 5.2: Basic record
Catalog
number Name Data type Remark
M004 recordID TextString Auto, e.g 2011/3869-8
M020 title TextString
M025 officialTitle TextString Public name of archive unit
M021 description TextString Textual description
M022 keyword TextString Keywords describing contents
M024 author TextString Name created or authored
M300 documentmedium TextString Optional for electronic
M301 storagelocation TextString Optional for electronic
Once the database tables are created, sample records are added into the
tables. Now at this stage we have NOARK data into our database. Since
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scalability is not an issue in our study, we took two records one from each to
address the integrity and authenticity requirements. The Java MakeXMLFile
code ( see Appendix) is applied to extract records from the database and
convert them into XML. The records at this point are in standard XML
format. The next step is to prepare the XML files for submission. To do
that, the records in the standard XML format should be prepared in the
record export format discussed in the next section.
Record export
As discussed in the information modeling section, the format of the record
export is the records with digital signature appended on.
To prepare the record export format, additional XML tags are added
to hold the signature information. This is necessary to separate the record
information from the signature information. Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 shows
the tags added to append the signature information.
After signature tags are added, the record is signed with the private key
of NOARK using XMLSec resulting the record export format(see Figure 5.3
and Figure 5.4) which is ready to be submitted into the archive using the
submission information package(SIP). A SIP; whose authenticity is verified
by the third party, is requested from Fedora Commons to submit the signed
records into the archive. As shown in Figure 5.5 a request to SIP is made by
using the ip address of the SIP as we do not have a domain name registered
for it. The third party verifies the identity of the SIP using its public key
which is registered and found with the third party. As can be seen from
Figure 5.6 the message “The identity of this website has not been verified”
is displayed as the key is not publicly registered. To address this public
registration problem for the purpose of testing the prototype, the public key
is manually verified as shown in Figure 5.7.
Finally the records are signed using the private key giving the record
export format(see Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4).
5.3 Findings
* Functional requirements of Authenticity and Integrity
Based on the literature studies done in this work, the functional re-
quirements of authenticity and integrity for archival objects could be
appending digital signature of the record management system to the
records to be archived. The digital signature as discussed in chapter
two, is made by signing the message digest value of the record with the
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Figure 5.1: Simplified record signing template
private key of the record keeping system – NOARK. Our experimen-
tal result shows that digital signature is sufficient condition to ensure
authenticity and integrity of archival objects.
* Functional requirements of chain of custody
In order to make the process of transferring records to archive we have
introduced a trusted third party. Documents verified by the trusted
third party as it is described in chapter three, are legally acceptable.
For that to happen, the third party needs to verify both the record man-
agement system (NOARK) and the archive repository (Fedora Com-
mons). In addition to this, the third party also stores the documents
transfered to the archive in its own database. By introducing third
party as it was stated in chapter four who can manage records trans-
fer to the archive by verifying and copying archive data could improve
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Figure 5.2: Basic record signing template
the evidential value of the archival objects. For instance, proofing the
archive objects against the third party could improve the evidential
value of the object for court cases.
* How to ensure authenticity and integrity during and after transfer
In order to ensure authenticity and integrity during and after transfer
we used the signature validation strategy mentioned in chapter four(see
Figure 4.18) and based on our finding considering the signature val-
idation strategy ensures authenticity and integrity during and after
records are transferred into the archive. That is the records transferred
to the archive using our strategy are found to be authentic and the
content is intact. We have deliberately changed the content and sig-
nature of records to be transferred to the archive and our proposed
solution properly detected the failure in authenticity and integrity of
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Figure 5.3: Record Export: simplified record
the records during transfer. In addition, we made changes to objects
after they have been archived and the proposed strategy identified the
failure in authenticity and integrity of the changed objects. Our exper-
iment shows that records archived using signature validation strategy
maintain authenticity and integrity during and after transfer into the
archive(see Appendix).
5.4 Summary
This chapter described the experiments and findings of the study. Sam-
ple NOARK records are generated and transferred into the archive. The
functional requirements of authenticity and integrity and ensuring them is
experimented. The result of the study shows that records archived in our
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Figure 5.4: Record export: basic record
framework are authentic, intact and have evidential value for court cases.
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Figure 5.5: SIP request
Figure 5.6: SIP authenticity
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Figure 5.7: SIP certificate
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
The thesis sets out to analyze the functional requirements of trust in elec-
tronic records management and archiving using authenticity and integrity as
the two elements of trust. To achieve the objectives, a framework is proposed
and prototyped for validation. This chapter concludes the thesis by outlining
its main contributions and directions for future work.
6.1 Main contributions
Interpretive is the underlying theoretical framework used to undertake this
study focusing on the explanatory case study of trust in recordkeeping and
archiving. The research has shown how authenticity and integrity can be
maintained which in turn increases the evidential value of the objects archived.
The main contribution of the study lies in its attempt to propose an
archival framework and apply the concepts of public key infrastructure into
the context of trusted archiving using NOARK and Fedora Commons. We
have seen how authenticity and integrity can be achieved using digital signa-
tures and how to detect a breach in authenticity and integrity. By focusing
on trust in electronic documents, we have also come to a closer understand-
ing of the problems in trusted archiving of digital objects having evidential
value. The proposed framework helped in establishing of trust in electronic
records archival.
Maintaining trust in records is a very complex matter as records can
be in transaction anytime before transferred to the archive. NOARK has
a mechanism of maintaining provenance of records by logging the activities
and the responsible party initiating the activity in every phase of the trans-
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action. In addition, the study narrows down its focus on transfer of records
labeled finalized to the archive; and analysis of the functional requirements
of authenticity and integrity during transfer to the archive.
The study demonstrated a method of appending digital signature on
records and a mechanism of verifying authenticity and integrity during trans-
fer of records to archive.
In the first chapter we asked five main questions repeated below:
1. what are the functional requirements of authenticity for long term
archiving of trusted objects?
2. what are the functional requirements of integrity for long term archiving
of trusted objects?
3. what are the functional requirements of trusted chain of custody for
archiving of trusted objects?
4. how do we ensure authenticity and integrity during the process of trans-
ferring records to archive?
5. how do we ensure authenticity and integrity after objects are being
archived?
We have shown why addressing these questions is interesting and relevant.
We have also answered the questions emphasizing on authenticity, integrity
and chain of custody in records archiving.
Table 6.1 summarizes the research questions and the activities done to
answer the questions.
Table 6.1: Summary of activities
Question Pre Ingest Transfer Archive
1 Sign objects Key exchange Verify signature
2 Object hash Send hash Verify hash
3 Trusted third party(TTP) TTP logs process TTP verifies process
4 Verify public key Compare hash Validate signature
5 Validate signature
The authenticity of a digital object is a verification of a set of accompa-
nying claims associated with the digital object . For a paper based letter,
the authenticity of the letter can be verified by expert analysis of a given
signers signature. The equivalent for digital objects has been discussed in
Section (2.3 and 4.5) where we see how public key cryptography is used to
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ensure authenticity as it provides for automated signing and verification of
signatures.
Question 1, the functional requirements of authenticity for the long term
archiving of trusted objects are with today’s technology given through the use
of public key cryptography. Public key cryptography can and should be used
to sign every digital object to be transferred to the archive. The integrity
of a digital object relates to whether or not that object has been altered in
anyway during the transfer to the archive. To achieve this the use of hashing
functions like MD5 can be employed. In fact these kind of functions are all
that is required to determine the integrity of a digital object. Interestingly
public key cryptography can also be used to ensure integrity. When a digital
object is signed with a public/private key any change to the digital object will
result in the failure of a verification process on the digital object. Public key
cryptography also opens up for privacy in that it allows the digital content to
be encrypted in a manner so only the archive can decrypt the digital object.
Question 2, the functional requirements of integrity for long term archiv-
ing of trusted objects are also covered by public key cryptography.
Question 3, the functional requirements of trusted chain of custody for
archiving of trusted objects are covered by the presence of a trusted third
party. One can not achieve trust unless the integrity and authenticity of the
objects are ensured. Trust as discussed in Section 2.2 is something that is
open to interpretation, but it is critical. Our study has shown that authentic-
ity and integrity can be built into the system to help the process of trusting
an object but it really is a result of the use of public key cryptography to
ensure them.
Question 4, to ensure authenticity and integrity during the process of
transferring records to archive can be achieved by using the signature valida-
tion strategy shown in Figure 4.18. Signature validation strategy allows for
the transfer of digital objects over the Internet. No special requirements are
needed but using the signature validation strategy to ensure the integrity and
authenticity of the digital objects is recommended, especially when records
contain sensitive information.
Question 5, to ensure authenticity and integrity after objects are being
archived is achieved by using the signature validation strategy mentioned
above. The validation strategy ensures the ingested objects maintain their
authenticity and integrity. To achieve this digital objects must be stored in a
digital library that prevents objects from tampering, accidental or deliberate.
The underlying assumption guiding this study is interpretive as it has
the potential to produce deep insight into information systems phenomena
including the management of information systems and information systems
development which is what this study seeks to realize by constructing mean-
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ing of trust in the context of the NOARK-5 and Fedora Commons. Docu-
ments, texts, standards and the researchers impression regarding trust gives
a qualitative approach to the study. In addition, the use of NOARK-5 and
Fedora Commons as context of the study makes the research strategy an
explanatory case study. We proposed a framework for archiving records as
described in section 4.4. We also developed a prototype as a proof of the
concepts in the proposed framework and validated the prototype( see section
3.6 for detail on validation).
6.2 Future work
The study geared towards the submission side of archiving and how to main-
tain trust in the process of submitting records to archive. An extension of the
study may approach the problem from the dissemination side and address
trust issues from the users of the archival objects side. The mechanisms of
arriving at the decision of trusting or not trusting an electronic content from
the users side and functional expectation of users for trusting a content pre-
sented to them is an interesting problem which can further be investigated.
In the study emphasis is given from records to archive submission and
on how to ensure trust after records are being archived. A natural extension
of this could be “what” and “how” to recover authenticity and integrity of
objects losing their authenticity and integrity after they are permanently
archived.
Dealing with legal matter specially in an electronic communication sys-
tems involves a complex matter of handling issues at a national and interna-
tional context. This might call for coordination and understanding of legal
issues in the involved parties which even sometimes worsen the situation as
what is legally acceptable in certain boundary is considered not acceptable in
another geographical boundary. Mechanisms of addressing such issues could
be proposed, coordinated and studied over time.
This study is an explanatory case study of trust in NOARK and Fedora
Commons. Studying the applicability of the proposed trust handling in other
archival context may be a problem worth pursing for further expansion and
validation of the work described above.
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Figure 1: Sample NOARK Table Generator
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Figure 2: Sample NOARK srecord Generator
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Figure 3: Sample XML extractor
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Figure 4: verifying the record export: accepted integrity
Figure 5: verifying the record export: failed integrity
Figure 6: Signature failure: authenticity of the recordkeeping system
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